EarlyStageVC

What’s Broken – Venture Capital or Venture Perceptions?

There is an oft-repeated mantra than venture capital is broken.  The evidence cited is the dismal absolute median returns of the venture capital industry.   It is true that the venture asset class has become more competitive in the economic sense, i.e., excess returns are more difficult to achieve.  That is to be expected.   Excess profits attract competitors and returns decline.   But that doesn’t mean all competitors converge to the equilibrium return. It just means that the winners will either have the same strategy as every one else with better execution, or simply better strategies.

Cambridge Associates is a leading consulting firm that benchmarks the venture capital and private equity industry.  Nearly everyone uses their data to assess whether investment performance of a VC firm is “top quartile” or not.  The reason is simple.  Top quartile performers garner the lions’ share of the profits.   Between 1994 and 2006 the returns of the top quartile funds compounded in value at rate nearly 7X that of the median venture capital firm. Cambridge recently compiled some statistics about the venture business which document this. The data are proprietary to Cambridge, but I will share with you a high level view of the results, with their permission.  Of course, the following discussion reflects only my own conclusions.

Once Upon a Time, Everyone Was Top Quartile
The 1994-1996 period was an exceptional time to invest. If you were the first investor in a company in that time period your average internal rate of return (IRR) was over 100%.  Repeat -- your AVERAGE IRR was over 100%!  Not surprisingly, when these excess returns became apparent in 1997-2000, the number of venture firms exploded, as did the amount of capital.  We all know this, and have observed the consequences for the past nine years. The period of 1994-1996 was the Wonder years.  Post-2000 has been more like the Wonder What Happened? years.

The prevailing wisdom from the pre-2000 period was that early stage venture capital is the place to be.  That same wisdom today is be anyplace but venture capital because the old model doesn’t work.  The facts from Cambridge shine a bright light on the alleged wisdom and illuminate a more nuanced, insightful understanding of what drives performance. 

Timing is Everything - Who Knew?
The data in the table below are a paraphrase of Cambridge’s findings.  (If you want the original data, you'll need to become a Cambridge client).  They categorized over 22,000 venture capital initial rounds of investment in a thirteen-year period.  Each investment round was classified from Seed stage to Public, and they calculated the IRR of the initial VC investments made in each year. For example, if Crosslink led a B round investment in NewCo in 1998 as our initial investment, the outcome of our initial and subsequent investments in NewCo would be attributed to the original 1998 investment decision.

I have simplified their presentation to indicate which stages in each year led to IRRs higher or lower than the average IRR of all investments in that year.  Basically, it is scorecard of what kinds of investments you should have been making each year.

The pattern clearly shows that the miracle years of 1996-1999 were all about early stage.  Here’s where the perception that early stage is everything became axiomatic.  Note that as the business cycle shifted in 2000, the best investments were no longer early stage. They were restarts, PIPEs and some late stage deals.  As the economy began to re-heat in the 2005-2008 period, the pendulum again swung back to earlier stage deals.

These data are consistent with our own experiences at Crosslink.  We raised Crosslink Ventures IV in 2000 and Crosslink Ventures V in 2006.  (Elsewhere I have discussed our sector-focused, stage-independent strategy of growth equity investing.)  Our results are consistent with the Cambridge data on venture performance over the same period.    We have found that an ability to move with the market, both by stage and by sector, is a critical factor in achieving top quartile performance or better.

History is Bunk
What are we to conclude from the data?  While market and entrepreneur selection remain fundamental to venture manager success, risk management, time-to-money, and inflection point investing have emerged as perhaps equally determinative of  top quartile performance.  We all know the ‘hits’ nature of the business has been dampened, perhaps forever, but that doesn't mean venture capitalists cannot achieve premium rates of return. The Cambridge data show the business has transformed into a mature asset class where relative performance varies across the business cycle. What’s broken is not the industry, but the outdated perceptions of what strategies drive top quartile performance.

The venture industry has disappointed for a long time, or so it seems.  Certainly that is true when measured against the exceptional period where the average IRR was 100%.  Popularity and profits are incompatible concepts over the long run.  Nevertheless, top quartile venture performance is still exceptional, relative to other asset classes. Below is a comparison of the SP500 performance over the past nine years to the venture funds of vintage year 2000.

Some might counter that the SP500 investment is 100% liquid and venture numbers are merely private equity accounting entries.   However, the $1 invested in the SP500 would be a fully "realized" $0.65 at 2008 year end, while even the median venture fund would have returned $0.48 of cash, plus an illiquid remainder.  The top quartile fund would likely have returned $0.90 or more, trumping the SP500, and still have a substantial upside.  

Are We Blinded By A Remembrance of Things Past?
So is the venture asset class broken?   It doesn't appear to be.  It seems our assumptions of what constitutes "venture performance" are anchored in an obsolete memory of absolute performance, when the world of investing is all relative.  The mythology around venture investing reinforces this belief. Like every business, the successful venture investment strategies require continuous re-invention, not just a repetition of what worked before. Venture capital certainly isn't a license to print money anymore, but it is still the best game in town.  It's just that the rules of the game have changed.

What Venture Capital Can Learn From Private Equity

Tom Giles at BusinessWeek was kind enough to give me a venue for discussing our venture capital strategy.  It combines a blend of best practices from early stage venture capital (like EIRs and seeding companies), and from private equity (like rigorous assessment of financial risk and return).

The key tenets of the approach are to invest in (1) highest  growth sectors (which change over time), (2) when the company has arrived at a key inflection point (which might be at any stage), and (3) in one of the top two companies in the category.   Having a public side to our business helps us stay realistic about both the financial risks of the deal (probability of exit, capital requirements, key operating metrics, etc.)  and it helps enormously in diligence.  This is why we have  been about to outperform even the top quartile of the VC industry since 2000.  The plant-a-seed-and-watch-it-blossom hasn't been effective for most of the industry; some, yes, most, no. There is a time to reap and a time to sow.  

The full version is here. 

G20 Pre-Announcement: World Leaders to Agree on Global Undo

London (April 1, 2009 -EarlystageVC Press):  In an unprecedented show of unity bordering on global delusion, leaders at the G20 Summit today agreed to implement a technique first invented by software technologists to restore order to the world’s economy.  The leaders agreed to implement a Global Undo to reset the world economy to a prior and more satisfactory profile.

The decision to Undo was not without rancor. As in the software version, one of the limiting factors in the restoration of the world economy is a shortage of available cache.   Cache is critical to preserving prior conditions and providing all participants with a sense of responsiveness and predictability in the system.   The U.S., with its long history of technological advantage, was seen by many developing countries as using its ability to manufacture cache to dominate the world economy.  “One of the problems with the easy cache policy of the United States is that excess cache creates bottlenecks in the smooth functioning of the world economy elsewhere,” said German Chancellor Angela Merkel. “Our memory is particularly over-optimized around this tradeoff.  We do not want to a return to the destructive race conditions and power dissipation that followed our prior experiences with excess cache.”

An additional source of tension was the choice of restore point in the world economy.  Many EU leaders advocated restoration to December 31 1998, the time when their economies unified on the euro as currency.  China, seeking to vanquish the dollar as the world’s reserve currency, advocated early 1933 as the restore point, just prior to when the U.S. abandoned the gold standard. 

Ultimately, the G20 leaders agreed to restore to 1979 as the new 2009.  The selection of 1979 was a concession to fears of hyperinflation, trading off certain 10-15% inflation against the possibility of something much worse.  Others saw 1979 and the precipice before the buildup of the U.S. housing boom and the beginning of the escalation of the U.S. deficits under Reagan and subsequent administrations.

Privately, officials from China, India, and Pacific Rim nations conceded that the rise in U.S. debt-fueled consumption was a major driver of the development of their own economies over the past 20 years. This is in stark contrast to pubic pronouncements that their economies are merely victims of U.S. policies. Now seeing the impact of destructive deceleration after a period of beneficial acceleration, the miracle of the G20 agreement on Global Undo is that world leaders will go forward from this restore point with greater restraint and awareness.

It is anticipated that the world leaders will behave as if they are all actors in a single world market, and not islands of financial self-interest.  Again, borrowing from the technology sector, the Network is the Economy.

If only…